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Date: | Tue, 5 Aug 1997 19:52:00 P |
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<<How about creating a new class of SIG membership. This would be a
paying/voting member. There could be an annual membership fee for each
SIG (maybe discounts for multiple SIGs?) that would give you a direct
voice/vote in the enhancements and priorities. Maybe each vote could be
worth a certain amount and organizations could buy extra votes by paying
the appropriate multiple.
This money would be funneled through Interex and made available to csy
for funding the projects. If csy thought it was better to contract out
the development, then so be it. If they wanted to add staff then that
would be ok as well.
Can this work? Well, a variation of this model has been at work with our
installed base for over 7 years and it works pretty good. In our case the
customers pool their resources to fund positions at QSS that work on
projects selected by the user's group. They have a technical monitor to
make sure the specifications are being followed and adequate progress is
being made.>>
In fact, don't we have another, quite a bit older & larger example that
this approach works? Something called the New York Stock Exchange? Owning
stock in a company sounds similar to owning "stock" in one of these
problem/enhancement channels:
1) If you don't really care to have a voice, you don't pay anything
2) If you want a voice, you put your money where your mouth is
3) If you want a louder voice, you put up more money
4) How loud your voice is depends exclusively on how much money you put
up; not on who you are, how big your employer is or isn't, where you
live, etc. etc.
5) If you're really committed to one issue, you put the bulk of your
investment there to make sure that your voice is heard
6) I'd better stop before this gets carried too far
Of course, it's also subject to the same problems and abuses as the stock
market, and even some that are prevented by the SEC for real
public-company ownership:
1) Lack of an interested membership can result in a few active members
exercising control out of proportion to their investment
2) If you are rich enough, you can buy control of the operation
3) If a large number of "stockholders" bail out all at once, the
operation suffers a crash
4) You can lose your investment by backing an idea that doesn't pan out
5) See #6 above
Interesting idea.
Steve
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