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Date: | Thu, 13 Apr 2006 07:24:58 -0400 |
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On Thu, 13 Apr 2006 06:38:10 -0400, Jerry Finn <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>The comprehensive 2004 report is different:
>
>http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html
Opps, I got the link wrong. Chapter 5 is Chemical weapons. Chapter 6 is
biological. My apologies.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap6.html
A snippet about the labs and 2003 report from the 2004 report.
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In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq
possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road
vehicles or railway wagons.
* Prior to OIF there was information indicating Iraq had planned and
built a breakout BW capability, in the form of a set of mobile production
units, capable of producing BW agent at short notice in sufficient
quantities to weaponize. Although ISG has conducted a thorough investigation
of every aspect of this information, it has not found any equipment suitable
for such a program, nor has ISG positively identified any sites. No
documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of
involvement have all proved
negative.
* ISG harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility in regards to
the breakout program.
* ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of
being mobile BW agent production units, and investigated the associated
evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed and
built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is
impractical to use the equipment for the production and weaponization of BW
agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW program.
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