For Denys, who wanted to see this on the list.  Used by permission.

Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute, copyright 2005

The Impending Collapse of Arab Civilization

Lieutenant Colonel James G. Lacey, U.S. Army Reserve

Proceedings, September 2005

Slender minarets with muezzins calling the faithful to prayer symbolize
the stability and timelessness of the Muslim world. This one in Rabi'ah,
a small town on the Iraqi-Syrian border, is a classic-and the Muslim
faith is flourishing. Arabs, however, most of whom are Muslims, are not.

If a country wants to be on the winning side of history it first and
foremost must get its grand strategy right. With that done, it can make
any number of operational mistakes and weather many a setback and still
walk away a winner. In the Cold War, our grand strategy of containing
the Soviet Union eventually won the day despite many tribulations over
the fifty years it was in place. Diplomat George Kennan's famous "X
Article," anonymously published in the journal Foreign Affairs in 1947,
became the conceptual pillar of Cold War strategy and withstood a
decades-long assault by critics until eventually vindicated by the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Was the containment theory hurt by
the vitriol of its critics? I would argue the opposite is true.
Criticism forced the supporters of containment theory to examine and
hone their arguments. In order to properly answer their critics,
supporters of containment were forced to continually evaluate their
strategic models under regularly changing conditions. The end result was
a strategy that proved adaptable to shifting circumstances and able to
garner the support of the bulk of public opinion.

Today, however, more and more of our strategic judgments are being built
upon the untested edifice of two books: Bernard Lewis' The Crisis of
Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror and Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. While there have been
a few critical reviews of both works, for the most part they have become
the basic canon of 21st century strategic thought with very little
serious negative commentary. In military publications and briefings
these works are now cited repeatedly and uncritically as authoritative
support for developing strategic concepts.

Both books paint a dismal global picture. Huntington argues that for
centuries civilizations have been kept apart by distance and serious
geographical obstacles. However, modern technologies are eroding these
obstacles and as civilizations begin to interact on a more regular basis
they will find each other so repugnant they will be unable to resist
trying to slaughter one another. Bernard Lewis is not as pessimistic
about the global environment. Rather, he focuses his dire warnings on
just the Muslim world, which appears to him on an irreversible road to
doom.

It amazes me that Huntington's theory of civilizational war ever gained
the traction it did. I had always assumed that everyone would awake one
day and discover Hindus were not planning the annihilation of the
Mongols, that Africans were incapable of getting together to fight
anyone, and that Europeans have lost the will to fight about anything.
Maybe, just maybe, some Arabs would like to take on their neighbors. But
let's assume for a moment that all twenty-two Arab nations put aside
their considerable differences and raise a military force to take on the
world, what would that force look like? Well, with a combined GDP a bit
less than Spain's, it probably would not amount to much. The combined
conventional military power of a united Arab world is not likely to keep
Pentagon planners up at night. Lewis, on the other hand, makes a good
argument for the collapse of the Islamic world. Unfortunately, by
accepting his thesis the United States is put in the unenviable position
of confronting a religion in what may be a prolonged conflict-prone
situation. Do we really want to make war on a religion? The major flaw
in Lewis's argument, though, is in the title of his book. Islam is not
in fact in a crisis state. From a purely religious point of view things
have not looked this good for the Muslim faith in hundreds of years.
Mosques are full, new adherents are pouring in, and the cash coffers are
being filled with donations. If this is a religious crisis it is one
most of the world's other faiths would envy.

A more accurate understanding of events leads to the conclusion that
Arab, not Muslim, civilization is in a state of collapse, and it just
happens that most Arabs are Muslims. In this regard, the fall of the
Western Roman Empire was a collapse of Western Europe and not a crisis
of Christianity. The next question is, how could the world have missed
an entire civilization collapsing before its eyes? The simple answer is
that no one alive today has ever seen it happen before. Well within
living memory we have seen empires collapse and nation-state failure has
become a regular occurrence, but no one in the West has witnessed the
collapse of a civilization since the Dark Ages. Civilizational collapses
take a long time to unfold and are easy to miss in the welter of daily
events.

Interestingly, on the Arab League's website there is a paper that
details all of the contributions made by Arab civilization. It is a long
and impressive list, which unfortunately marks 1406 as the last year a
significant contribution was made. That makes next year the 600th
anniversary of the beginning of a prolonged stagnation, which began a
dive into the abyss with the end of the Ottoman Empire. Final collapse
has been staved off only by the cash coming in from a sea of oil and
because of a few bright spots of modernity that have resisted the
general failure.

Statistics tell an ugly story about the state of Arab civilization.
According to the U.N.'s Arab Human Development Report:

There are 18 computers per 1000 citizens compared to a global average of
78.3.

Only 1.6% of the population has Internet access.

Less than one book a year is translated into Arabic per million people,
compared to over 1000 per million for developed countries.

Arabs publish only 1.1% of books globally, despite making up over 5% of
global population, with religious books dominating the market.

Average R&D expenditures on a per capita basis is one-sixth of Cuba's
and less than one-fifteenth of Japan's.

The Arab world is embarking upon the new century burdened by 60 million
illiterate adults (the majority are women) and a declining education
system, which is failing to properly prepare regional youth for the
challenges of a globalized economy. Educational quality is also being
eroded by the growing pervasiveness of religion at all levels of the
system. In Saudi Arabia over a quarter of all university degrees are in
Islamic studies. In many other nations primary education is accomplished
through Saudi-financed madrassas, which have filled the void left by
government's abdication of its duty to educate the young.

In economic terms we have already commented that the combined weight of
the Arab states is less than that of Spain. Strip oil out of Mideast
exports and the entire region exports less than Finland. According to
the transnational Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), regional economic growth is burdened by declining rates of
investment in fixed capital structure, an inability to attract
substantial foreign direct investment, and declining productivity - the
economic trinity of disaster.

Economic stagnation coupled with rapid population growth is reducing
living standards throughout the region, both comparatively and in real
terms. In the heady days of the late 1970s oil boom, annual per-capita
GDP growth of over 5% fueled high levels of expectations. GDP per-capita
grew from $1,845 to $2,300. Today, after adjusting for inflation, it
stands at $1,500, reflecting an overall decline in living standards over
30 years. Only sub-Saharan Africa has done worse. If oil wealth is
subtracted from the calculations the economic picture for the mass of
Arab citizens becomes dire.

Things are indeed bad in the Arab world and will get much worse.

This statement should not be read as mere opinion. While predictions of
the future are usually fraught with peril, those based on demographics
are, barring some unforeseen plague or truly catastrophic war, uncannily
accurate. Using even the most optimistic assumption-that fertility rates
drop by fifty percent in a generation-the respected Population Resource
Center, based in Princeton, New Jersey, expects Arab populations to grow
from 280 million to almost 460 million by 2020 and to over 600 million a
generation later. On the face of it the Arab world is staring political
and economic disaster in the face. Arab governments and institutions are
already failing to meet basic human needs in many Arab countries. It is
hard to imagine how they will cope with the stress of such a massive
population increase.

The percentage of the population under age 15 is double that of Western
Europe and those under age 24 make up 50% to 65% of Middle East
countries-an astonishingly young population. This youth bulge is already
beginning to rock the foundations of Islamic society. Upheaval and
revolution are the likely results of a massive number of youth
confronted by stagnating or collapsing economies as they enter
adulthood.

A youth bulge has always correlated strongly with increased levels of
violence within a society, from terrorism to war. Massive youth violence
is predictably more likely when lack of economic opportunity stunts
ambitions for a satisfying job, a good marriage, and a home. A 2004
study by The World Bank calls this combination of a youth bulge coupled
with poor economic performance an "explosive combination." In socially
and politically repressive societies, found throughout the Middle East,
there are very few outlets for pent-up frustrations except for violence
or immersion into religion-a combustible mixture. In the Middle East, it
is evident that terrorism and especially suicide operations are a
phenomenon closely associated with youth. Youthful involvement in
terrorism can be viewed as the extreme end of a broader youthful
attraction to violence more generally. Additionally, this attraction is
being reinforced within a generation that is being radicalized by an
environment featuring high levels of violence, radical religious
ideology, and growing anti-Americanism.

One serious question that requires an answer is why youth are attracted
to Islamic organizations, which to Western eyes appear to be extremely
repressive to many of the aspirations and desires of typical young men
and women? In a 2003 Brookings Institution paper, Graham Fuller, a
senior resident consultant at the RAND Corporation, provides this
answer:

    . . . the religious activism of Islamism in the Muslim world is not
politically conservative at all: it calls for change to the status quo
that is broadly hated. Much of the youthful spirit of rebellion against
the status quo can thus be readily harnessed by the Islamist movement,
both violent and non-violent. They provide a channel for the expression
of discontent, blessed and legitimized by powerful religious tradition
that incorporates nationalist impulses as well. It is noteworthy that
Islamism serves as a vehicle of protest everywhere except where it is in
power, such as Iran and Sudan. It is the status quo that is the major
target of anger. (Author's emphasis)

A youth bulge is always destabilizing, but it can often be managed if a
society is able to properly educate its youth and provide them with
adequate economic opportunities at the end of the education process.
Arab nations are failing in both areas.

As I see it, the overarching cause of civilizational collapse is that
culture and institutions of that civilization can no longer adapt to
external stresses. This assertion is grounded in my interpretation of
the writings of Will Durant, Story of Civilization, John Roberts' The
Rise of the West, and Fernand Braudel's A History of Civilizations. The
tyrants and dictators who have long ruled the Arab world have proven
unable to implement the changes required to reverse the trends of
collapse. Unable to reverse economic and societal ills, and unresponsive
to the mass of the Arab population, these rulers instituted polices of
strong internal oppression, which further closed off Arab society from
the adoption of new ideas and methods.

Populations that were unable to influence their governments found that
some methods of expression were still allowed within the context of
Islam. Working within this framework radicals found that they could
shelter their activities within a religious infrastructure, while at the
same time religious leaders realized that they were gaining enough
strength to make a grasp for secular power. This was a struggle that
went on in the West for a thousand years after the fall of Rome until
finally won by secular authority during what is now called the Age of
Reason.

Still, Islam is not the root cause of collapse. For instance, it has not
stood in the way of economic advancement and societal adaptation in
Asia. It is more accurate to say that fundamental failure of Arab
culture is causing people to begin looking backwards at the golden age
of their civilization. Two things ring out to them from those past
centuries: Arabs were powerful when they were united and when their
faith was new, vital, and fundamental.

A lot of the evidence that Huntington presents for his theory of
civilizational war makes more sense when viewed through the prism of the
collapse of Arab civilization. Global maneuvering that Huntington
interprets as preparations for a new round of world conflict are in
reality the spontaneous adjustments that other societies are making in
reaction to the collapse of a neighboring civilization. By accepting
that we are facing the collapse of Arab civilization we can, for the
first time, create a grand strategic concept for success. We no longer
have to engage in a war against terrorism, which is a method of fighting
and not an enemy. Additionally, we now have a strategic explanation for
what is going on that does not make Islam the culprit. Hence we do not
have to fight a religious war to win.

The grand strategic concept that provides the best chance of success is
the one that served us so well in the Cold War-containment. No matter
what else we do we must position ourselves to contain the effects of the
complete collapse of Arab civilization. Already 10 percent of the French
population is from Muslim North Africa. Europe's ability to assimilate a
larger flood of economic refugees is questionable. And mass migration is
just one effect a total collapse will have. Containment will mean
adopting and maintaining difficult policy choices, which include:

    * Working closely with the European nations to defend their southern
border against the mass migration of tens of millions of destitute Arabs
as well as armed confrontations with failing Arab states.
    * Renewing our close ties with Turkey and making that nation a
bulwark against the effects of collapse.
    * Working to help modernize and integrate the Russian military into
an enhanced European defense structure.
    * Ensuring China is a partner in this containment effort.
    * Propping up weak border states that are already dealing with the
spillover effects of Arab collapse-such as Pakistan and the new Caucasus
states.
    * Assisting the Iranian popular will to establish a government not
based on a religious oligarchy. The Persian people may form an eastern
bulwark against collapse.
    * Plan for the security of critical resources even during possible
upheavals and regional turmoil.
    * Spillover effects such as terrorist groups already evident in
places like Indonesia and the Philippines must be eradicated or
reversed.
    * We need to be clear that this is not a failure of Islam. In this
regard we must help Muslims outside of the Arab world find their own
interpretations of their faith and not fall prey to those being espoused
by the Arab world-Wahhabism.

None of the above policy prescriptions will be easy, nor can they be
achieved overnight. Most of them require the support of other nations,
which may be problematic. Many of these nations have not recognized the
risks they face from Arab collapse and see no reason to take preemptive
measures. It is easy to say that we need to work closely with Europe to
secure its southern border. In reality, that task will be devilishly
hard, not least because the Europeans appear very reluctant to take any
measures to protect themselves that might give even a whiff of
intolerance. Furthermore, American diplomacy, as of recent decades, has
not shown it is up to accomplishing many of the recommended tasks. For
instance, all attempts to engage Iran since the fall of the Shah have
been a debacle. Unfortunately, as the Iranian nuclear crisis unfolds
there is no indication we have gotten any better at it. Do we have the
wherewithal to engender a democratic society in Iran and then to engage
its support in our common interests? Can we deal with an increasingly
autocratic and threatening Russia? Can we manage China's emergence as a
superpower so that it can be peacefully integrated into the global
political system? The answers to these questions are still unknown.
However, because containment of a civilizational collapse cannot be done
by the United States alone finding the right answers is critical.

By accepting that we need to contain the effects of a failing Arab
civilization we are then free to adopt one of three basic approaches:

   1. Attempt to accelerate the collapse and pick up the pieces, akin to
letting an alcoholic hit bottom.
   2. To contain the effects, but not to interfere with the fall for
good or bad.
   3. Reverse the tide when and where we can.

For a number of ethical and practical reasons the third choice is the
one that should and is most likely to be adopted, keeping in mind that
resisting the macro-forces of historical change will not be easy.

By adopting the third option we can craft policies to improve economic
conditions and help specific regions within the Arab world adapt to
encroaching modernity. The United States must be able to spot shining
lights in the Arab world and work to protect them even as we help to
expand their influence. Discarding the theories of two men as eminent as
Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis is not a matter to take lightly.
History may even prove both men right and my analysis to be well off the
mark. However, the almost blind acceptance now being given to these
men's ideas is a dangerous trend. As military leaders build the
strategic plans and policies that will guide our forces for a generation
or more it is best to be skeptical of all underlying assumptions. This
article is designed to strike at the foundation of the two most widely
accepted arguments in the current forum of ideas. If they are correct
and sturdy then my position will not topple them. In fact, like Kennan's
X article they will be made stronger by having to defend themselves
against criticism. If they are weak, then it is best to discard them
now.

Lieutenant Colonel Lacey is a Washington-based writer focusing on
defense and international affairs issues. He was embedded with the 101st
Airborne Division during the war in Iraq. He served on active duty for a
number of years and later edited journals on international finance.

Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute, copyright 2005

Original article may be viewed below:
You may be prompted to register with the Naval Institute Web site to
view this page.
http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles05/Pro09Lacey.htm


Tracy Johnson
Measurement Specialties, Inc. 

BT







NNNN

* To join/leave the list, search archives, change list settings, *
* etc., please visit http://raven.utc.edu/archives/hp3000-l.html *