From Stratfor, I included the advertisements, so skip to the second dotted line for the text.
BT
Tracy Johnson
MSI Schaevitz Sensors
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2004 19:17:07 -0500 (CDT)
From: Strategic Forecasting <[log in to unmask]>
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Subject: Geopolitical Intelligence Report: The Bush-Kerry Consensus
Geopolitical Intelligence Report: The Bush-Kerry Consensus
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THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The Bush-Kerry Consensus
October 12, 2004
By George Friedman
During the two presidential debates held so far, we have learned three
things. First, that George W. Bush never made a mistake. Second, that John
Kerry would never have made any of the mistakes Bush made, and that he does
not intend to make any mistakes in the future. Third, and most important,
that there is precious little substantial disagreement between the two
candidates on war strategy going forward. Whatever Kerry has had to say about
Bush's execution of the war in the past, he has made it clear that he will
continue what Bush calls the "War on Terror" and that he will not abandon the
war in Iraq.
This last is by far the most important thing to have emerged during the
campaign from a geopolitical and strategic point of view. However much the
candidates argue over who would be better at fighting the war, it has become
clear that the war will go on regardless of who is elected or re-elected --
and that that includes the Iraq campaign. Neither is promising a radical
redefinition of the war. Each is claiming simply to be the more effective in
executing the war.
Therefore, on this fundamental level, the election has become unimportant.
What is important is how the war will be executed after the election. Neither
candidate has been particularly enlightening on this subject. There has been
no substantial discussion of follow-on campaigns or operations either in the
general war or in Iraq. From an American point of view, this should be
comforting. Underneath the storm and stress, the two parties have -- as
unbelievable as this might sound -- agreed that the war must continue
unabated. They have also agreed, in effect, that discussing war plans during
a debate would not serve anyone's interest. For whatever reason -- patriotism
or political expediency -- the campaign is being carried out within careful,
prudent boundaries. The future of the war is not being debated. The campaign
is being confined to vicious personal invective.
Since we know that the war will continue, it falls to us to consider how it
will be executed after Nov. 2. One fundamental fact must be borne in mind:
Since the war will not be abandoned, it will be the war, not the candidates,
that will determine the course of events. What we mean is simply this: The
war has an inherent logic that constrains policymakers. If you continue to
fight this war, there are certain things that you must do, and certain things
that are impossible. The choices are much fewer than what one might imagine.
Therefore, having agreed on the basic strategy that the war will continue,
most of what follows from this decision will apply to either a President Bush
or a President Kerry. If you are going to make fried chicken, there aren't
that many ways to do it.
U.S. and al Qaeda War Aims
The primary American war aim is simple: The United States wants to secure its
homeland against any further attacks by al Qaeda or any other group using its
tactics. It is a clear and simple war aim. The goal is easy to define, but
far more difficult to achieve. The United States is full of potential
targets, and al Qaeda is a very small and dispersed group. Defending the
homeland -- in the sense of physically preventing the penetration of the
United States by al Qaeda operatives -- is difficult to achieve, and it is
even harder to know whether you have achieved it. Since al Qaeda is a global,
sparse network consisting of covert operatives skilled at evading U.S.
intelligence, an offensive strategy is equally difficult to execute. It is
not merely a question of destroying al Qaeda. It is more a matter of knowing
when you have destroyed all of al Qaeda that you need to destroy. At this
point in the war, no reasonable person would claim the United States has
achieved its primary war aim.
Al Qaeda's war aim is more complex. Its goal is to trigger a massive uprising
in the Islamic world that will sweep away at least one and preferably several
existing Muslim governments, replacing them with jihadist regimes. These
countries would serve as the nucleus for the restoration of the Islamic
Caliphate that would both restore the authority of Islamic law -- understood
in al Qaeda's terms -- while setting the stage for the political
reconstruction of Islamic greatness.
Thus far, al Qaeda has failed in its war aim. Contrary to dire forecasts, the
single most important fact of the war has been a negative: There has been no
rising in the Islamic streets of sufficient substance to endanger any
established Islamic government (Iraq is excluded inasmuch as it lacks an
established government). Not a single Islamic government has shifted its
stance in support of al Qaeda while many -- some overtly like Libya, some
covertly like Syria -- have moved toward suppressing al Qaeda on their
territory.
Since al Qaeda initiated the war, it is critically important to understand
that it has completely failed to achieve its strategic goals. From a purely
political standpoint, the war has thus far been a disaster for al Qaeda. At
the same time, assuming that al Qaeda has not lost the ability to carry out
operations, the United States has not yet secured the homeland from follow-on
attack. This is more a military-security failure than a political one, but it
remains a failure. To this moment therefore, al Qaeda is losing the war from
a political point of view, while the United States has failed to win the war
from a military point of view.
Strategies
The American strategy has been driven by a realization that the United States
does not by itself have the intelligence and covert capabilities needed to
destroy the al Qaeda network. Without the active support of Muslim
governments, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the United States
cannot hope to destroy al Qaeda and secure the homeland. By the same token,
many of these countries have little appetite for a vicious back-alley war
with al Qaeda. Such a war threatens the survival of their regimes by
increasing the chance that either al Qaeda will strike directly at the
political leadership, or that the covert war will trigger a backlash that
will create an uprising among the masses.
U.S. strategy has therefore focused on inducing or coercing these governments
not only to strike out at al Qaeda and jihadists in general, but also to have
them work in tandem with U.S. intelligence so their combined capabilities can
be that much more effective. In order to do this, these countries had to
become certain of three things: First, that the United States would punish
them severely if they did not cooperate; second, that they had more to fear
from the United States than from al Qaeda; and finally, that the United
States was willing to bleed with them.
We can argue endlessly at this point about the wisdom of the Iraq campaign or
about the Bush administration's justifications for it. Stratfor readers know
our view of this well. This fact, however, is incontestable: Prior to the
Iraq campaign, the key country, Saudi Arabia, was not cooperating with the
United States in trying to crush al Qaeda. After the Iraq campaign the Saudis
did begin to cooperate with increasing intensity, the proof of which has been
the jihadist attacks in Saudi Arabia. There were not attacks before the war.
There were increasing attacks after the war. Clearly the Saudis were taking
actions that the jihadists didn't like.
What we are seeing is coalition warfare in the fullest sense. However, it is
not the "traditional allies" (France and Germany) that can bring the needed
resources to bear. It is the Islamic countries whose intelligence services
have the most knowledge of jihadist networks, and who are the most valuable
allies in this war. Coalitions change depending on goals, and in this war
that means joining with Islamic powers.
This is not a coalition of the eager, or even of the willing. In many cases
it is a coalition of the blackmailed, bullied and coerced. Some countries,
like Egypt, are deeply hostile to al Qaeda and the jihadists. Others, like
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, have little appetite for this conflict and will
cooperate only to the extent that they are forced and induced to do so. Al
Qaeda can be crushed only to the extent that these countries are induced to
cooperate. At this moment, most Islamic countries -- even Syria and, at
times, Iran -- have with great reluctance done what they were forced to do.
President Bush or Kerry, if he chooses to continue to prosecute the war, will
have to continue to carry out a strategy of coercion against those Islamic
countries whose participation is essential. It is a fantasy to believe that
countries like Saudi Arabia will risk their internal tranquility on behalf of
the interests of the United States. Their interests diverge from America's.
Therefore, all strategies will have to focus on maintaining the pressure for
cooperation. Kerry will have an opportunity for a few months of creative
diplomacy before returning to this course; Bush will simply continue this
course. But in the end, the United States will have to frighten these
countries more than al Qaeda does, while demonstrating its ability and
willingness to protect the regimes.
If the United States were to simply withdraw from Iraq at this point, it
would undermine U.S. credibility with these regimes. Therefore, as both Bush
and Kerry have stated, they will remain in Iraq. Bush's rhetorical flights
notwithstanding, this will not be about building democracy. The one obvious
lesson learned in Vietnam is that you do not do nation-building in the midst
of a guerrilla war. The purposes of remaining in Iraq now are:
1. Creating a psychological atmosphere in which Islamic countries do not
doubt American will.
2. Setting rational, achievable goals.
3. Matching goals with resources.
Leaving Iraq is not an option. Defining the mission effectively is an option.
The United States will neither bring an end to the guerrilla war, nor will it
bring democracy to Iraq. However, the actual intensity of the guerrilla war,
compared to such wars in Vietnam or Algeria, is much lower. The United States
has -- in about 18 months -- lost fewer than 2 percent dead compared to
Vietnam. The goal for the United States in Iraq is not to end violence but to
reduce U.S. casualties even further. That means reducing the exposure of U.S.
forces by reducing their security responsibilities.
This does not require fully trained Iraqi troops to take the place of U.S.
forces. Since violence cannot be eliminated, trading somewhat higher levels
of violence for lower U.S. casualties is clearly the option that will be
pursued. Bush is currently mounting an offensive to set the stage for this by
attacking guerrilla strongholds. This offensive will create a temporary
window that will allow the United States to become less intrusive; however,
the guerrillas appear to have substantial recuperative powers, at least at
the relatively low levels of effectiveness at which they are currently
operating.
The need to reduce the exposure of U.S. forces by withdrawing to bases -- as
in Afghanistan -- or to the west of the Euphrates is not simply conditioned
by Iraqi reality. It is also conditioned by the U.S. force structure. The
first problem either Bush or Kerry will face as president is the fact that
the U.S. military -- particularly the Army and Marine Corps -- is too small
for the war. A mistake was made under the Bush administration, and will not
be rectified by either president. This will not mean a draft. Apart from
political consequences, this is not World War II. The kind of troops needed
take a long time to train and mature. They need to be highly motivated and
capable. The volunteer force will have to be massively expanded through a
vast increase in the defense budget. Kerry or Bush will propose this early
on.
There is no choice, particularly because al Qaeda's strategy must now be to
counter the United States in the Islamic world. As the attacks in Egypt last
week showed, jihadists are expanding operations in the Islamic world. If they
cannot topple the Saudi, Pakistani or Egyptian governments through an
uprising, they will try to sap their strength through ongoing, low-grade
conflict. At a certain point -- and the point is unpredictable -- the United
States might have to suddenly intervene in any of a host of Islamic countries
in order to stabilize exhausted regimes. At this moment, the United States
does not have the manpower to do so. The expectation that the United States
will have the option of whether to intervene is unrealistic. Events will
determine what the United States has to do, and al Qaeda -- having failed
thus far -- is not giving up. It intends to shape events. This excludes the
possibility that a U.S.-Iranian confrontation might suddenly explode.
If all goes well -- and it has not gone nearly as badly as some would say --
there remains the endgame, in which the United States destroys the command
cell of al Qaeda. That cell is by all reports in northwestern Pakistan, and
the Pakistanis show no appetite for going in and getting it. The United
States will have to commit forces to the task in the end, and right now the
forces aren't there.
Having agreed that the war will continue and that there will be no withdrawal
from Iraq, these things simply follow. The pressure on reluctant allies in
the Islamic world will continue. The United States will not leave Iraq, but
will reduce its exposure. Forces must be held in reserve for al Qaeda
countermoves. Kerry might well hold a meeting with the French. Bush will
undoubtedly make speeches about building democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Politicians must be granted their little pleasures. Democrats seem to love
European summits, which seem to remind them of John F. Kennedy or something.
Republicans love to call things evil, which seems to remind them of evil.
Neither French help nor rhetorical gestures will make the slightest
difference. Whether they know it or not, Bush and Kerry have agreed on one
thing: The only thing they have to offer is blood, toil, sweat and tears.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
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