Subject: | |
From: | |
Reply To: | Shahan, Ray |
Date: | Thu, 2 Sep 2004 13:05:28 -0500 |
Content-Type: | text/plain |
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And we can add to the list of why/how:
Hp never tried to market the hp3k to anyone other than the installed base.
Hp siphoned of monies for/from the 3k to further the cause of the hp-ux box.
Regards,
Ray Shahan
> -----Original Message-----
> From: HP-3000 Systems Discussion [SMTP:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Duane Percox
> Sent: Thursday, September 02, 2004 12:57 PM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: [HP3000-L] any new migration success stories?
>
> Alfredo writes:
>
> >At 9:47 -0800 9/1/04, Duane Percox wrote:
> >
> >>However, for anyone selling software on the HPe3000, by
> >>2001 the system had become disadvantaged against the marketplace.
> >
> >Excellent use of the passive voice ;-)
> >
> >How and why had it "become disadvantaged"? I just had a
> >long chat with a high-performance TurboIMAGE user who
> >mentioned the verb "squander" as a description of the
> >activity (or, rather, passivity) involved in the process
> >of "causing something to become disadvantaged".
>
> I would offer this single point of input. I am sure
> there are others:
>
> The commodity server marketplace through continued investment
> developed product offerings that rivaled the HPe3000 because
> the HPe3000 did not have a high enough rate of investment to
> keep it's leadership position.
>
> Or to put it another way:
>
> The HPe3000 was treading water while the rest of the marketplace
> was swimming toward the finish line.
>
> If you agree with this basic assumption then we should explore
> the 'why/how' did this happen? How about:
>
> * Installed base of HPe3000 not large enough to sustain continued
> rate of investment against high volume (commidity) server
> products.
>
> * HP's lack of interest in investing in a system that was losing,
> not gaining momentum.
>
> * 9x7 systems too reliable and too good for the price caused many
> customers to buy and not need to buy again.
>
> * HP management could not create a sustainable revenue model that
> leveraged the installed base so existing 'happy' customers
> didn't provide on-going revenue for investment in the platform.
>
> * HP management over-focus on the installed base customer caused HP
> to invest in the platform for the currently installed customers
> who did not spend money buying new systems instead of investing
> in platform needs to attract new customers.
>
> * HP management reluctance to 'shake up' the marketplace and take one
> final chance by coming to market with a/n class systems with outrageous
> price/performance numbers. Instead they chose to 'stay the course' and
> we got systems with performance ratings far below what they could have
> been. As Stan Sieler said when he saw the system configs/ratings:
> "You have killed the HP 3000".
>
> * HP management choice to pursue the A class instead of the L class as the
> low-end server choice.
>
> * HP's too long-2-market-delivery of the a/n class systems created a window
> of opportunity for other server solutions reducing sales and subsequent
> investment in platform opportunities.
>
> duane
>
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