Fred White wrote:

This may interest you.

> (Jonkers) (CBS 20 Feb 03)
> (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/18/iraq/main537096.shtml)

FW

I think you may find the article below interesting too! 


March 13, 2003
The French Connection
By WILLIAM SAFIRE





ASHINGTON 
France, China and Syria all have a common reason for keeping American and 
British troops out of Iraq: the three nations may not want the world to 
discover that their nationals have been illicitly supplying Saddam Hussein 
with materials used in building long-range surface-to-surface missiles.
We're not talking about short-range Al Samoud 2 missiles, which Saddam is 
ostentatiously destroying to help his protectors avert an invasion, nor 
his old mobile Scuds. The delivery system for mass destruction warheads 
requires a much more sophisticated propulsion system and fuels.
If you were running the Iraqi ballistic missiles project, where in the 
world would you go to buy the chemical that is among the best binders for 
solid propellant? 
Answer: to 116 DaWu Road in Zibo, a city in the Shandong Province of 
China, where a company named Qilu Chemicals is a leading producer of a 
transparent liquid rubber named hydroxy terminated polybutadiene, 
familiarly known in the advanced-rocket trade as HTPB.
But you wouldn't want the word "chemicals" to appear anywhere on the 
purchase because that might alert inspectors enforcing sanctions, so you 
employ a couple of cutouts. One is an import-export company with which 
Qilu Chemicals often does business. 
To be twice removed from the source, you would turn to CIS Paris, a 
Parisian broker that is active in dealings of many kinds with Baghdad. Its 
director is familiar with the order but denies being the agent.
A shipment of 20 tons of HTPB, whose sale to Iraq is forbidden by U.N. 
resolutions and the oil-for-food agreement, left China in August 2002 in a 
40-foot container. It arrived in the Syrian port of Tartus (fortified by 
the Knights Templar in 1183, and the Mediterranean terminus for an Iraqi 
oil pipeline today) and was received there by a trading company that was 
an intermediary for the Iraqi missile industry, the end user. The HTPB was 
then trucked across Syria to Iraq. 
Syria has no sophisticated missile-building program. What rocket weaponry 
it has comes off the shelf (and usually on credit) from Russia, so it 
therefore has no use for HTPB. But cash-starved Syria is the conduit for 
missile supplies to cash-flush Saddam, as this shipment demonstrates. We 
will have to wait until after the war to find out how much other weaponry, 
for what huge fees, Saddam has stored in currently un-inspectable Syrian 
warehouses. 
The French connection ? brokering the deal among the Chinese producer, the 
Syrian land transporter and the Iraqi buyer ? is no great secret to the 
world's arms merchants. French intelligence has long been aware of it. The 
requirement for a French export license as well as U.N. sanctions approval 
may have been averted by disguising it as a direct offshore sale from 
China to Syria.
I'm also told that a contract was signed last April in Paris for five tons 
of 99 percent unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine, another advanced missile 
fuel, which is produced by France's Société Nationale des Poudre et 
Explosifs. In addition, Iraqi attempts to buy an oxidizer for solid 
propellant missiles, ammonium perchlorate, were successful, at least on 
paper. Both chemicals, like HTPB, require explicit approval by the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee before they can be sold to Iraq.
Perhaps a few intrepid members of the Chirac Adoration Society, formerly 
known as the French media, will ask France's lax export-control 
authorities about these shipments. U.N. inspectors looking at Iraq's El 
Sirat trading company might try to follow its affiliate, the Gudia Bureau, 
to dealings in Paris. 
Is this account what journalists call a "keeper," one held back for 
publication at a critical moment, made more newsworthy by the Security 
Council debate? No; I've been poking around for only about a week, 
starting with data originating from an Arab source, not from the C.I.A. 
(Anti-Kurdish analysts at Langley have it in for me for embarrassing them 
for 18 months on Al Qaeda's ties to Saddam, especially in the terrorist 
Ansar enclave in Iraqi Kurdistan.)
This detail about the France-China-Syria-Iraq propellant collaboration 
makes for dull reading, but reveals some of the motivation behind the 
campaign of those nations to suppress the truth. The truth, however, will 
out.   

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company | Privacy Policy 




March 13, 2003
The French Connection
By WILLIAM SAFIRE




ASHINGTON 
France, China and Syria all have a common reason for keeping American and 
British troops out of Iraq: the three nations may not want the world to 
discover that their nationals have been illicitly supplying Saddam Hussein 
with materials used in building long-range surface-to-surface missiles.
We're not talking about short-range Al Samoud 2 missiles, which Saddam is 
ostentatiously destroying to help his protectors avert an invasion, nor 
his old mobile Scuds. The delivery system for mass destruction warheads 
requires a much more sophisticated propulsion system and fuels.
If you were running the Iraqi ballistic missiles project, where in the 
world would you go to buy the chemical that is among the best binders for 
solid propellant? 
Answer: to 116 DaWu Road in Zibo, a city in the Shandong Province of 
China, where a company named Qilu Chemicals is a leading producer of a 
transparent liquid rubber named hydroxy terminated polybutadiene, 
familiarly known in the advanced-rocket trade as HTPB.
But you wouldn't want the word "chemicals" to appear anywhere on the 
purchase because that might alert inspectors enforcing sanctions, so you 
employ a couple of cutouts. One is an import-export company with which 
Qilu Chemicals often does business. 
To be twice removed from the source, you would turn to CIS Paris, a 
Parisian broker that is active in dealings of many kinds with Baghdad. Its 
director is familiar with the order but denies being the agent.
A shipment of 20 tons of HTPB, whose sale to Iraq is forbidden by U.N. 
resolutions and the oil-for-food agreement, left China in August 2002 in a 
40-foot container. It arrived in the Syrian port of Tartus (fortified by 
the Knights Templar in 1183, and the Mediterranean terminus for an Iraqi 
oil pipeline today) and was received there by a trading company that was 
an intermediary for the Iraqi missile industry, the end user. The HTPB was 
then trucked across Syria to Iraq. 
Syria has no sophisticated missile-building program. What rocket weaponry 
it has comes off the shelf (and usually on credit) from Russia, so it 
therefore has no use for HTPB. But cash-starved Syria is the conduit for 
missile supplies to cash-flush Saddam, as this shipment demonstrates. We 
will have to wait until after the war to find out how much other weaponry, 
for what huge fees, Saddam has stored in currently un-inspectable Syrian 
warehouses. 
The French connection ? brokering the deal among the Chinese producer, the 
Syrian land transporter and the Iraqi buyer ? is no great secret to the 
world's arms merchants. French intelligence has long been aware of it. The 
requirement for a French export license as well as U.N. sanctions approval 
may have been averted by disguising it as a direct offshore sale from 
China to Syria.
I'm also told that a contract was signed last April in Paris for five tons 
of 99 percent unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine, another advanced missile 
fuel, which is produced by France's Société Nationale des Poudre et 
Explosifs. In addition, Iraqi attempts to buy an oxidizer for solid 
propellant missiles, ammonium perchlorate, were successful, at least on 
paper. Both chemicals, like HTPB, require explicit approval by the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee before they can be sold to Iraq.
Perhaps a few intrepid members of the Chirac Adoration Society, formerly 
known as the French media, will ask France's lax export-control 
authorities about these shipments. U.N. inspectors looking at Iraq's El 
Sirat trading company might try to follow its affiliate, the Gudia Bureau, 
to dealings in Paris. 
Is this account what journalists call a "keeper," one held back for 
publication at a critical moment, made more newsworthy by the Security 
Council debate? No; I've been poking around for only about a week, 
starting with data originating from an Arab source, not from the C.I.A. 
(Anti-Kurdish analysts at Langley have it in for me for embarrassing them 
for 18 months on Al Qaeda's ties to Saddam, especially in the terrorist 
Ansar enclave in Iraqi Kurdistan.)
This detail about the France-China-Syria-Iraq propellant collaboration 
makes for dull reading, but reveals some of the motivation behind the 
campaign of those nations to suppress the truth. The truth, however, will 
out.   



opyright 2003 The New York Times Company | Privacy Policy 
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