Denys:

An excellent summary.  I don't know if the shows will be repeated, but the
past couple of weeks there have been several excellent shows on The History
Channel that I've had the pleasure to view.  One was 2 hours on Admiral
Halsey, another about the history of destroyers, another on the use (and
inadequate use) of submarines, and another with the poor performance of
American torpedoes during the opening months (year?) of WW II (less than
50% of American torpedoes exploded - many harmlessly bounced off of enemy
ships when both their contact fuses and magnetic fuses failed to detonate
the explosive charge).

John


At 2002-06-04 01:21 PM, Denys Beauchemin wrote:
>Today marks the 60th anniversary of the battle of Midway.  The Japanese
>intentions were to smash the remnants of American naval power in Pacific and
>advance Japan's outer defensive perimeter more than a thousand miles further
>by seizing the western Aleutians, Midway and ultimately Fiji, Samoa and New
>Caledonia.  This would also sever the Allied lifeline between the U.S west
>coast and Australia in preparation for the invasion of Australia.
>
>Taking part in the operation was the Pearl Harbor strike force commanded by
>Admiral Nagumo, now down to 4 fleet carriers after loses in the battle of
>the Coral Sea the month before.  The Americans were outnumbered, but Admiral
>Chester Nimitz had a fairly good idea of the Japanese objective due to some
>good guessing and fortuitous code breaking.
>
>On the morning of the 4th, a Consolidated PBY reconnaissance plane spotted
>the Japanese carriers.  Attack planes were launched from the carriers
>Enterprise and Hornet while the Japanese planes were attacking Midway
>itself.  The attack on Midway met with fierce resistance from the planes
>based there.  While this first attack was under way, Admiral Nagumo had
>ordered a second strike readied in case the American carriers he knew to be
>around had to be attacked.  However the leader of the Midway strike returned
>ahead of his attack force and urged that a second strike be made against
>Midway to destroy it as a useful base.  During the time Nagumo was thinking
>about this, the Midway-based bombers hit his fleet.  The attack was repelled
>at great loss to the American planes and no damage to the Japanese fleet.
>However, this attack convinced Nagumo to launch the second strike against
>Midway.  He was confident the American carriers were nowhere in the
>vicinity, so he ordered the planes already armed and fueled on deck to be
>rearmed with bombs for land attack.  Fifteen minutes into this operation, a
>Japanese reconnaissance plane reported spotting American ships in the
>distance.  Nagumo fretted over this information for another 15 minutes and
>then ordered the rearming stopped and reversed so that his planes would now
>have armor-piercing bombs and torpedoes, weapons suitable for attacking
>warships. Confusion reigned on the 4 Japanese carriers, with bombs and
>torpedoes strewn every which way, planes landing from the attack on Midway
>and fuel everywhere.
>
>The US planes, 116 fighters, dive-bombers and torpedo bombers were already
>in the air and approaching at that time.  Another 35 planes had also
>launched from the Yorktown, which was much closer to the Japanese fleet.
>The timing of the launch was calculated to coincide with return of the
>Japanese planes to their carriers after attacking Midway.
>
>Unfortunately, Admiral Nagumo had ordered a course change right after the
>last Midway strike planes returned.  The Hornet's fighters and dive-bombers
>missed the Japanese task force entirely.  This caused the torpedo bombers to
>go in unsupported with the loss of all the planes and every crewmen but one.
>The torpedo bombers of the Yorktown and Enterprise suffered a similar fate
>and from a total of 56 TBD planes sent in, only 8 survived and not a single
>hit hat been scored.  At that point the Japanese thought they had won the
>battle.
>
>However, in 90 seconds the whole outcome was reversed.  The 37 dive-bombers
>from the Enterprise under the command of Lt. Cmdr McClusky arrived over the
>carriers, just as the last TBD was downed.  The Japanese CAP (combat air
>patrol) was at low altitude, having dealt with the attacking TBDs.  The
>dive-bombers were virtually unopposed, attacking 4 large carriers with
>aircraft, bombs and torpedoes, and fuel on deck. Within seconds, the Kaga
>and the Akagi got hit by bombs that touched off uncontrollable fires.  At
>that time, the 17 SBD dive-bombers from the Yorktown arrived on the scene
>and immediately put 3 bombs on the deck of the Soryu, which also burned
>uncontrollably.  Inside of 5 minutes, Nagumo had lost three fleet carriers,
>Pearl Harbor attackers all.
>
>Nagumo ordered his last carrier, the Hiryu, to launch a strike on the
>Yorktown.  The 50 bombers and fighters followed the American aircraft home.
>The Yorktown CAP and the escort vessels accounted for most of the attackers
>but some did manage to get through and they put 3 bombs and 2 torpedoes into
>the Yorktown, which had still not totally recovered from the damage she had
>suffered at the battle of the Coral Sea.
>
>Reconnaissance planes from the Enterprise had spotted the Hiryu and she
>launched 14 of her own SBDs and 10 of Yorktown's against the Hiryu.  This
>last carrier, also one of the Pearl Harbor attackers went down after taking
>4 hits.  A few days later, the Yorktown after being taken in tow was
>ultimately sunk by a Japanese submarine, along with an escorting destroyer.
>
>The Battle of Midway was over; the Japanese Imperial Navy had lost four of
>its finest carriers and any chance to eliminate the U.S. Navy from the
>Pacific.  These carriers were invaluable to the Japanese who did not have
>the industrial capacity to replace them in a timely fashion.  They also lost
>hundreds of planes and pilots who were also difficult to replace.
>
>This battle was the turning point in the war in the Pacific.
>
>Denys
>
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