Post-Tenure Review: AN AAUP Response
The report which follows was approved by the Association's Committee A on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, adopted by the Association's Council in June
1998, and endorsed by the Eighty-fourth Annual Meeting.
I. Introduction
The Association's existing policy on post-tenure review, approved by
Committee A and adopted by the Council in November 1983, is as follows:
Association believes that periodic formal institutional evaluation of each
postprobationary faculty member would bring scant benefit, would incur
unacceptable costs, not only in money and time but also in dampening of
creativity and of collegial relationships, and would threaten academic freedom.
The Association emphasizes that no procedure for evaluation of faculty should be
used to weaken or undermine the principles of academic freedom and tenure. The
Association cautions particularly against allowing any general system of
evaluation to be used as grounds for dismissal or other disciplinary
sanctions. The imposition of such sanctions is governed by other established
procedures, enunciated in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure and the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty
Dismissal Proceedings, that provide the necessary safeguards of academic due
process.
More than a decade later, new forms of post-tenure review are fast becoming
a reality: a significant number of legislatures, governing boards, and
university administrators are making such reviews mandatory, others are in
various stages of consideration. For this reason it has become necessary to
reaffirm the principles of the 1983 statement, but also to provide standards
which
can be used to assess the review process when it is being considered or
implemented. After revisiting the arguments for and against post-tenure
review, this report offers practical recommendations for faculty at
institutions where post-tenure review is being considered or put into effect.
The principles guiding this document are these: post-tenure review ought to
be aimed not at accountability, but at faculty development. Post-tenure
review must be developed and carried out by faculty. Post-tenure review must
not be a reevaluation of tenure nor may it be used to shift the burden of
proof from an institution's administration (to show cause for dismissal) to
the individual
faculty member (to show cause why he or she should be retained). Post-
tenure review must be conducted according to standards that protect academic
freedom and the quality of education.
Definition of Terms
Because post-tenure review is used to mean many things, it is important to
define our understanding of the term. Lurking within the phrase are often
two misconceptions: that tenured faculty are not already recurrently subject
to a variety of forms of evaluation of their work, and that the presumption
of merit that attaches to tenure should be periodically cast aside so that
the faculty member must bear the burden of justifying retention. Neither
assumption is true, as will be further developed. Although it would perhaps
be best to utilize a term other than post-tenure review, most alternative
expressions (such as periodic evaluation of tenured faculty ) do not clearly
enough dispel the misconceptions, and the more familiar term has become so
widely adopted in academic parlance that it would only create additional
confusion were it not used here.
Post-tenure review is a system of periodic evaluation that goes beyond the
many traditional forms of continuous evaluation utilized in most colleges
and universities. These traditional forms of evaluation vary in their
formality and comprehensiveness. They include annual reports for purposes of
determining salary and promotion, reviews for the awarding of grants and
sabbaticals,
reviews for appointment to school and university committees, to graduate
faculties and interdisciplinary programs, and to professorial chairs and
professional societies. More narrowly focused reviews include
course-by-course student teaching evaluations, peer review and wider public
scrutiny of scholarly presentations and publications, and both
administrative and collegial
observation of service activities. Faculty members are also reviewed in the
course of the program reviews required for regional or specialized
accreditation and certification of undergraduate and graduate programs.
What post-tenure review typically adds to these longstanding practices is a
formalized additional layer of review which, if it is not simply redundant,
may differ in a number of respects: the frequency and comprehensiveness of
the review, the degree of involvement by faculty peers, the use of
self-evaluations and the articulation of performance objectives, the extent
of constructive
feedback, the application of innovative standards and principles, and the
magnitude of potential sanctions. At its most draconian, post-tenure review
aims to reopen the question of tenure; at its most benign, it formalizes and
systematizes longstanding practices. In this report, we use the term
post-tenure review to refer to the variety of practices that superimpose a
more comprehensive and systematic structure on existing processes of
evaluation of tenured faculty.
Post-tenure review has been proposed not only by some who are fully
committed to academic freedom and tenure, who view it as an aid to
professional development and revitalization, but also by some who view
tenure as an obstacle to "flexible" institutional management and to faculty
"accountability."
With this report, the Association addresses the matter on the side of the
supporters of tenure and academic freedom. Among other things, we reject any
demand for accountability that takes the form of a belief that faculty
members are properly subject to administrative criticism, let alone
discipline, for teaching or research that is regarded by some to be
misguided, ill-informed, or out of step with institutional trends or
priorities. So understood, accountability is inconsistent with the very core
of academic freedom, which extols the worth to society of the faculty
member's autonomy and self-direction. But we do reaffirm that with tenure
comes professional responsibility, the obligation conscientiously and
competently to devote one's energies and skills
to the research, teaching, and service missions of the academy. Faculty
should be responsible for their performance, and that is indeed why what
many of the critics are calling for--regular performance evaluations--have
been in place, in a variety of forms, throughout higher education.
Nonetheless, there is considerable disagreement concerning the role formal
post-tenure review
might play in the evaluation process.
II. Arguments of Post-Tenure Review Proponents and Opponents
Numerous arguments of varying degrees of subtlety and persuasiveness have
been advanced in support of, and in opposition to, post-tenure review. The
Association believes that these might be set forth in a dialogue that best
reveals the complexities of the issue, after which we state some of
our basic conclusions.
Those proponents of post-tenure review who insist that its purposes are
fundamentally benign emphasize its role in fostering and supporting
professional development: periodic evaluations as well as self-assessment
can encourage renewal, heightened motivation, and professional growth and
redirection in teaching and research over the course of a career. Faculty
effort, it is said, can be stimulated through the more effective allocation
of institutional support and individual faculty benefits as incentives and
rewards. The proponents claim that, to the extent the review is carried out
by faculty peers, it fosters mutual respect and a sense of collective
purpose, and it ensures collegial responsibility for assessment and
decision-making. They also assert that such programs help to discharge the
institution's responsibilities- -to its students and to the public--to
optimize the skills and performance of its faculty, and thereby to
strengthen the institution's quality and reputation.
Opponents of post-tenure review do not deny that some of its exponents have
entirely well-intentioned arguments on its behalf. They often, however,
respond by pointing to the wide range of evaluative measures, noted above,
already long in place in most colleges and universities. It is not likely
that a more structured system of post- tenure review will significantly
better inform
faculty of their accomplishments and shortcomings. Any minimal benefits will
almost assuredly be outweighed by the costs to the faculty and the
institution in terms of diverted time and energy devoted to observation and
comment, along with the attendant logistical and paperwork burdens. More
worrisome for the skeptics is their concern that the benign rhetoric that
surrounds the
arguments for post-tenure review may mask the fact that other less
sympathetic supporters of post-tenure review are seeking to supplement the
existing mechanisms with a system of managerial accountability designed in
significant measure to redirect faculty priorities (possibly with some
degree of coercion). This additional layer of review will either become
routinized and potentially redundant or will have more serious consequences,
whether intended or nanticipated; neither outcome is desirable.
The proponents of post-tenure review respond that annualized evaluations are
not necessarily effective, either in rooting out serious cases of
unproductivity or in providing positive incentives for change. Post-tenure
review, they argue, can be a fair method of identifying faculty members in
need of assistance and can ensure provision of institutional resources to
rectify problems and improve performance in teaching and research (e.g.,
through teaching workshops and
collaborative teaching, study projects and leaves, and conference and travel
funds).
Opponents retort that the much-vaunted claim that institutions will set
aside significant additional resources for faculty support and development
has most often been belied by reality, particularly in this time of
widespread and severe budgetary restraints (the very condition that has
fueled so many calls for post-tenure review). They also assert that a common
argument for post-tenure
review--that everyone knows some faculty members who do not perform
adequately --also suggests why comprehensive, across-the-board review is an
unnecessary and excessively costly means of identifying inadequate
performers. The at-best marginally useful reassessment of the overwhelming
proportion of the faculty who are discharging their responsibilities
conscientiously and competently is too blunt an instrument and too wasteful
an enterprise if the purpose is to
identify, even for developmental purposes let alone for discipline, the
extremely small number who are seriously underperforming. Some add the
argument that scarce funds would be far better deployed in rewarding
high-performing faculty members. Moreover, developmental reviews, opponents
contend, may be a potentially coercive mechanism imposed without sufficient
protection of faculty autonomy and self-direction, and connected to an
implicitly rigid set of
expectations. If indeed such reviews are genuinely voluntary, they may
provide appropriate opportunities for tenured faculty who wish to revitalize
or redirect their efforts. But if--as is very commonly the case--they are
part of a system of disciplinary sanctions levied in cases of weak faculty
performance, they may short-circuit the formal demonstration of inadequate
performance which must otherwise take place through peer judgment, according
to judicial standards that
respect academic freedom and tenure.
Many proponents of post-tenure review would point out that because the
system can be designed to provide accountability to colleagues and
administrators, and even to rest primarily in faculty hands, it does not on
its face violate academic freedom or professional integrity. On the
contrary, by assuring the public that the faculty is accountable for its own
performance, post-tenure review not only enhances the reputation of the
institution but also protects academic freedom by diminishing the likelihood
of public intervention. The same result will follow when a comprehensive
system of post-tenure review at a given institution will likely document the
very widespread accomplishments of the faculty, within the institution and
within the community, and the extremely
small number of underperforming faculty and the positive steps being taken
to assist in their development and improvement.
Those responding to this point would argue that there is a danger in the
contention that academic freedom is not compromised so long as faculty
themselves control the review. While affirming the principle that faculty
should indeed exercise the primary responsibility in such cases, these critics
of post-tenure review say that responsibility is best exercised in a context
in which the principles of tenure serve as a bulwark not only against
external critics but also against casually or tendentiously critical
attitudes of one's own colleagues. Furthermore, it is not at all
self-evident that the public will be satisfied with such a system if it does
not periodically produce sacrificial
goats (in the form of dismissed faculty) or that such a system is likely to
make much difference in enhancing an institutional reputation best secured
by high educational quality, not new and more elaborate forms of personnel
management.
Post-tenure review is sometimes described as a way of increasing the
fairness to the individual under review. Such reviews can establish a record
that may be proof against the charges that sometimes emerge suddenly due to
a controversial action by the faculty member or the advent of a new and
uninformed administrator. Moreover, it is argued, under a properly designed
system of
post-tenure review individuals may be afforded the time and resources
requisite to improvement; too often, without such a system, the
underperformer carries on, suffering the disdain of colleagues and students,
and creating attendant demoralization throughout the institution, while
being subjected to the continuing informal sanctions already available to
dissatisfied administrators. In addition, if a particular review is unfair
or inappropriately intrusive, the faculty member can grieve and seek a
correction of the record prior to the imposition of a major sanction. Thus,
according to this line of reasoning, post-tenure review allows an
underperforming faculty member to improve with collegial and institutional
support, and allows the fully competent
faculty member to build a positive record of achievements as protection
against future criticism, unfounded accusations of unsatisfactory
performance, unwarranted sanctions, or interference from agencies outside
the institution.
Critics of post-tenure review will concede that a positive record may indeed
provide a hedge against administrative intrusion. They also point out,
however, that the argument can be stood on its head, inasmuch as mixed or
unfavorable reviews likewise establish a record and may require challenge or
appeal, even if there is no immediate threat of a sanction, in order to
avoid prejudicing one's position in future reviews. This means that even
reviews conducted solely with a
view to offering positive assistance in correcting deficiencies may cause
faculty members to become defensive and litigious; this in turn will lead to
the creation of possibly cumbersome, and yet more time- consuming, processes
for appeal and additional peer review. If an accumulation of critical or
negative reviews results in a decision to pursue a major sanction like
suspension or
dismissal, the very fact that those reviews are on the record may
significantly lessen the burden of proof on the institution to show adequate
cause for levying the sanction. To put it slightly differently,
unsatisfactory ratings based on a non-adjudicative peer procedure in which
the administration has carried no prior burden of proof may lead to a formal
hearing in which the presentation of the same unproven unsatisfactory
ratings shifts the burden of proof to the tenured
faculty member.
In any event, post-tenure review ought not, say the critics, be based on a
belief that it will result in any greater faculty turnover. Studies do not
find higher dismissal rates among faculty in non-tenure-track systems; and
institutions that lack tenure systems are generally less rigorous in
their reappointment reviews. Difficult dismissal decisions can be, and often
are, repeatedly deferred to the next date in the review cycle.
An important juncture in post-tenure review plans resides at the point at
which it is decided whether the reviews are to be blanket, imposed uniformly
across all ranks on some kind of principle of rotation, or are instead to be
focused only on problematic faculty cases. A blanket review obviously
carries with it a greater diversion of faculty and administrative time and
energy in making and documenting assessments, and may create more pervasive
risks of collegial conflict or demoralization--or its opposite, routinized
and mutualized plaudits. Prudential questions of cost and feasibility aside,
blanket review doubtless reduces the stigma that may attach to individual
faculty members; if, on an impersonally rotating calendar, all tenured
faculty must be reviewed, then there is no automatic presumption that a
review is rooted in a prior perception of individual inadequacy. Selective
evaluation, by contrast, risks invidious singling out of faculty members
less well regarded for reasons that may or may not be related to
professional performance. Presumably, too, such evaluation would not take
place on an already fixed schedule, at least initially, but would be called
into play by the showing of a need which itself would require
definition. On the other hand, selective or focused appraisals of faculty
members may arguably be more honest inasmuch as they are stimulated by the
perception of a problem, rather than masking hostile intent under the benign
patina of everyone must be reviewed.
The Association, having reflected upon the conflicting contentions developed
in the above dialogue, concludes that the system of evaluation that is least
intrusive upon faculty autonomy and responsibility, and thus least dangerous
when measured by AAUP-supported standards, is likely to be one based on the
mechanisms already well established within the academy. If a more formal
and systematic element of post-tenure review is to be added, we believe that
it should have a predominant if not exclusive emphasis upon faculty
development rather than upon disciplinary sanctions. Such an emphasis, if
properly buttressed by institutional resources without adversely affecting
other aspects of the academic program, can in many instances result in
discernible improvement in faculty performance across all levels of quality
and seniority--with little or no real or perceived dilution of academic
freedom or tenure. More problematic, as will be developed immediately below,
is a system of post-tenure review that links periodic evaluation with
potential sanctions for teaching or research that falls below some
(frequently undefined) performance standard.
III. Post-Tenure Review and Academic Freedom: A General Caution
Post-tenure review should not be undertaken for the purpose of dismissal.
Other formal disciplinary procedures exist for that purpose. If they do not,
they should be developed separately, following generally accepted procedures.1/
Even a carefully designed system of post-tenure review may go awry in a
number of ways of serious concern to the Association. Many, though not all,
proponents of post-tenure review purportedly seek to supplement preexisting
ways of reviewing the performance of tenured faculty with a system of
managerial accountability that could ensure faculty productivity, redirect
faculty
priorities, and facilitate dismissal of faculty members whose performance is
deemed unsatisfactory. Despite assurances by proponents that they do not so
intend, the substitution of managerial accountability for professional
responsibility characteristic of this more intrusive form of post-tenure
review alters academic practices in ways that inherently diminish academic
freedom.
The objectionable change is not that tenured faculty would be expected to
undergo periodic evaluation. As noted here, they generally do -- and they
should. Nor is there any claim that tenure must be regarded as an indefinite
entitlement. Tenured faculty are already subject to dismissal for
incompetence, malfeasance, or failure to perform their duties, as well as on
grounds of bona fide financial exigency or program termination. Nor is the
issue, as many faculty imagine, simply who controls the evaluation. Faculty
members as well as administrators can and do err.
Rather, the most objectionable feature of many systems of post-tenure review
is that they ease the prevailing standards for dismissal and diminish the
efficacy of those procedures that ensure that sanctions are not imposed for
reasons violative of academic freedom. Some proponents of post-tenure
review, motivated by a desire to facilitate the dismissal of tenured
faculty, seek to substitute
less protective procedures and criteria at the time of post-tenure review.
But demanding procedures and standards are precisely what prevent dismissal
for reasons violative of academic freedom.
If the standard of dismissal is shifted from incompetence to unsatisfactory
performance, as in some current proposals, then tenured faculty must
recurrently satisfy administrative officers rather than the basic standards
of their profession. And as already noted, some forms of post-tenure review
shift the burden of proof in a dismissal hearing from the institution to the
tenured faculty member by allowing the institution to make its case simply
by proffering the more casually developed evaluation reports from earlier
years. Effectively the same concerns arise when the stipulated channel for
challenging substantively or procedurally unfair judgments in the course of
post-tenure review is through a grievance procedure in which the burden of
proving improper
action rests with the faculty member.
Academic freedom is not adequately protected in any milieu in which most
faculty members bear the burden of demonstrating a claim that their
dismissal is for reasons violative of their academic freedom. The heightened
protection of the tenured faculty is not a privilege, but a responsibility
earned by the demonstration of professional competence in an extended
probationary period,
leading to a tenured position with its rebuttable presumption of
professional excellence. 2/ It chills academic freedom when faculty members
are subjected to revolving contracts or recurrent challenge after they have
demonstrated their professional competence.
When post-tenure review substitutes review procedures for adversarial
hearing procedures, or diverse reappointment standards for dismissal
standards, it creates conditions in which a host of plausible grounds for
dismissal may cloak a violation of academic freedom. Innovative research may
be dismissed as unproven, demanding teaching as discouraging, and
independence of mind as a lack of collegiality. The lengthy demonstration of
competence that precedes the award of tenure is required precisely so that
faculty are not recurrently at risk and are afforded the professional
autonomy and integrity essential to academic quality.
We recognize that some tenured faculty members may, nonetheless, fail to
fulfill their professional obligations through incompetence, malfeasance, or
simple non-performance of their duties. Where this appears to exist,
targeted review and evaluation should certainly be cons idered, in order to
provide the developmental guidance and support that can assist the faculty
member to overcome those difficulties. Should, however, it be concluded that
such developmental assistance is (or is likely to be) unavailing, the remedy
lies not in a comprehensive review of the entire faculty, nor in sacrificing
the procedural protections of the tenured faculty member, but in an orderly
application of longstanding procedures such as those in the Association's
Recommended Institutional Regulations (Regulations 5-8) for the imposition
of sanctions up to and including dismissal.
In other cases, faculty members may voluntarily agree to redirect their work
or to accept early retirement incentives as a consequence, for example, of a
decision to redirect departmental priorities. But the use of sanctions
pursuant to individual reviews to induce resignation of programmatically
less desirable faculty members or to redirect otherwise competent faculty
endeavors may well have deleterious consequences for academic freedom. The
prohibition on the
use of major sanctions to redirect or reinvigorate faculty performance
without a formal finding of inadequacy does not mean that administrators and
colleagues have no less demanding recourse to bring about improvement.
Although academic acculturation will ordinarily have provided a sufficient
incentive, the monetary rewards or penalties consequent on salary,
promotion, and grant reviews can and do encourage accommodation to
institutional standards and professional values.
Even on campuses where there is not thought to be a problem with so-called
deadwood or incompetent faculty members, many proponents of post-tenure
review, as well as those who adopt it in the hope of forestalling more
comprehensive and blatant attacks on tenure, sometimes envision such review
as a means for achieving larger management objectives such as downsizing,
restructuring, or re-engineering. Individual faculty reviews should,
however, focus on the quality of the faculty member's work and not on such
larger considerations of programmatic direction. Downsizing may be properly
accomplished through long-term strategic planning and, where academically
appropriate, formal program discontinuance (with tenured faculty subject to
termination of appointment only if reasonable efforts to retrain and
reassign them to other suitable positions are unsuccessful).
It might be thought that the untoward impact on academic freedom and tenure
may thus be eliminated by implementing a system of post-tenure review that
has no explicit provision for disciplinary sanctions. Even here, however,
where the reviews are solely for developmental ends, there is a natural
expectation that, if evidence of deficiency is found, sanctions of varying
degrees of subtlety and severity will indeed follow absent prompt
improvement. Hence, even the most
benign review may carry a threat, require protections, and inappropriately
constrain faculty performance. This point warrants further elaboration.
A central dimension of academic freedom and tenure is the exercise of
professional judgment in such matters as the selection of research projects,
teaching methods, student evaluations, and course curricula, as well as the
choice of colleagues. Those who have followed recent attacks on faculty
workloads know that the issue rapidly shifted from the allegation that
faculty did not work enough (which it turned out they plainly did) to the
allegation that faculty did not do the right sort of work. Some proponents
of post-tenure review will thus not be content with the identification of
the few slackers already known to their colleagues by other means, nor even
with the imposition
of a requirement of faculty cooperation and institutional loyalty. They also
want faculty members to give back some portion of their ability to define
their own work and standards of performance. For example, increased emphasis
on students' evaluations of teaching may lead to the avoidance of curricular
experimentation or discourage the use of more demanding course materials and
more rigorous standards. Periodic review that is intended not only to ensure
a level of faculty performance (defined by others than faculty) but also to
shape that performance accordingly, and regardless of tenure, is a most
serious threat to academic freedom.
Another consequence of the misapplication of the managerial model to higher
education is the ignoring of another important dimension of academic freedom
and tenure: time, the time required to develop and complete serious
professional undertakings. Shortening the time horizon of faculty, so as to
accord with periodic reviews, will increase productivity only artificially,
if at all. More
frequent and formal reviews may lead faculty members to pick safe and quick,
but less potentially valuable, research projects to minimize the risk of
failure or delayed achievement.
By way of summary, then, of the Association's principal conclusions,
well-governed universities already provide a variety of forms of periodic
evaluation of tenured faculty that encourage both responsible performance
and academic integrity. Those forms of post-tenure review which diminish the
protections of tenure also unambiguously diminish academic freedom, not because
they reduce job security but because they weaken essential procedural
afeguards. The only acceptable route to the dismissal of incompetent faculty
is through carefully crafted and meticulously implemented procedures that
place the burden of proof on the institution and that ensure due process.
Moreover, even those forms of post-tenure review which do not threaten
tenure may diminish academic freedom when they establish a climate that
discourages controversy or risk-taking, induces self-censorship, and in
general interferes with the conditions that make innovative teaching and
scholarship possible. Such a climate, although frequently a product of
intervention by trustees or legislators, may instead regrettably flow on
occasion from unduly
intrusive monitoring by one's faculty peers.
Comprehensive post-tenure review is thus a costly and risky innovation,
which may fail either to satisfy ill-informed critics on the one hand or to
protect professional integrity on the other. If managerially imposed, it may
be a poor substitute for the complex procedures colleges and universities
have gradually crafted to balance professional responsibility and autonomy.
On the other hand, if designed and implemented by the faculty in a form that
properly safeguards
academic freedom and tenure and the principle of peer review, and if funded
at a meaningful level, it may offer a way of evaluating tenured faculty
which supports professional development as well as professional
responsibility. To that end, we offer the following guidelines and standards.
IV.A. Guidelines for Deciding Whether or Not to Establish a Formal System of
Post-Tenure Review
1.It is the obligation of the administration and governing board to
observe the principle, enunciated in the Statement on Government of Colleges
and Universities, that the faculty exercises primary responsibility for
faculty status and thus the faculty is the appropriate body to take a
leadership role in designing additional procedures for the evaluation of
faculty peers. Faculty representatives in the development of those
procedures should be selected by the faculty according to procedures
determined by the faculty. 3/
2.Any discussion of the evaluation of tenured faculty should take into
account procedures that are already in place for that purpose: e.g., annual
merit reviews of teaching, scholarly productivity, and service;
comprehensive consideration at the time of promotion to professor and
designation to professorial chairs; and programmatic and accreditation
reviews that include analyses of the qualifications and performance of
faculty members in that program. The discussion should elicit convincing
data on what it is that existing procedures fail to address. The questions
for faculty bodies include:
a.What are the problems that are calling for this particular
solution? Are they of a degree that requires more elaborate, or more
focused, procedures for enhancing faculty performance?
b.If the answer to the latter question is Yes, would it be possible
to devise a system of post- tenure review on the basis of existing
procedures--for example, a five-year review that is piggybacked onto the
annual reviews? It should be noted that this system may serve a constructive
purpose for those departments that do not do an adequate job in their annual
review.
c.Is the projected post-tenure review confined to developmental
purposes or is it being inappropriately projected as a new and easier way of
levying major sanctions up to and including dismissal?
3.If the institution does not already have in place standards for
dismissal-for-cause proceedings, it should adopt such procedural standards
as are set forth in existing Association policy statements rather than
moving to post-tenure review as an alternative dismissal route. 4/
4.Just as the Association has never insisted on a single model of faculty
governance but only on the underlying premises that should guide a college
or university in respect to that governance, so here any particular form of
post-tenure review will depend on the characteristics of the institution:
its size, its mission, and the needs and preferences of the faculty, as well
as on the resources that it can bring to bear in the area of faculty
development. Again, the questions to be asked include, but are not
necessarily limited to:
a.whether the review should be blanket for all tenured faculty or
focused on problematic cases;
b.whether a review can be activated at the request of an individual
faculty member for purposes that he or she would regard as constructive;
c.whether a cost-benefit analysis shows that institutional resources
can adequately support a meaningful and constructive system for post-tenure
review without damage to other aspects of the academic program and to the
recognition of faculty merit, since the constructiveness of such a system
depends not only on the application of these standards but also on the
ability to support and sustain faculty development.
5.Any new system of post-tenure review should initially be set up on a
trial basis and, if continued, should itself be periodically evaluated with
respect to its effectiveness in supporting faculty development and
redressing problems of faculty performance, the time and cost of the effort
required, and the degree to which in practice it has been effectively
cordoned off--as it must be if it is to be constructive-- from disciplinary
procedures and sanctions.
IV.B. Minimum Standards for Good Practice if a Formal System of Post-Tenure
Review is Established
1.Post-tenure review must ensure the protection of academic freedom as
defined in the 1940 Statement of Principles. The application of its
procedures, therefore, should not intrude on an individual faculty member's
proper sphere of professional self-direction, nor should it be used as a
subterfuge for effecting programmatic change. Such a review must not become
the occasion for a wide-ranging fishing expedition in an attempt to dredge
up negative evidence.
2.Post-tenure review must not be a reevaluation or revalidation of
tenured status as defined in the 1940 Statement. In no case should
post-tenure review be used to shift the burden of proof from the
institution's administration (to show cause why a tenured faculty member
should be dismissed) to the individual faculty member (to show cause why he
or she should be retained).
3.The written standards and criteria by which faculty members are
evaluated in post-tenure review should be developed and periodically
reviewed by the faculty. The faculty should also conduct the actual review
process. The basic standard for appraisal should be whether the faculty
member under review discharges conscientiously and with professional
competence the duties appropriately associated with his or her position, not
whether the faculty member meets the current standards for the award of
tenure as those might have
changed since the initial granting of tenure.
4.Post-tenure review should be developmental and supported by
institutional resources for professional development or a change of
professional direction. In the event that an institution decides to invest
the time and resources required for comprehensive or "blanket" review, it
should also offer tangible recognition to those faculty members who have
demonstrated high or improved performance.
5.Post-tenure review should be flexible enough to acknowledge different
expectations in different disciplines and changing expectations at different
stages of faculty careers.
6.The outcome of evaluations should be confidential, that is, confined to
the appropriate college or university persons or bodies and the faculty
member being evaluated, released only at the discretion or with the consent
of the faculty member.
7.If the system of post-tenure review is supplemented, or supplanted, by
the option of a formal development plan, that plan cannot be imposed on the
faculty member unilaterally, but must be a product of mutual negotiation. It
should respect academic freedom and professional self- direction, and it
should be flexible enough to allow for subsequent alteration or even its own
abandonment. The standard here should be that of good faith on both sides--a
commitment to improvement by the faculty member and to the adequate support
of that improvement by the institution-- rather than the literal fulfillment
of a set of
non-negotiable demands or rigid expectations, quantitative or otherwise.
8.A faculty member should have the right to comment in response to
evaluations, and to challenge the findings and correct the record by appeal
to an elected faculty grievance committee. 5/ He or she should have the same
rights of comment and appeal concerning the manner of formulating, the
content of, and any evaluation resulting from, any individualized
development plan.
9.In the event that recurring evaluations reveal continuing and
persistent problems with a faculty member's performance that do not lend
themselves to improvement after several efforts, and that call into question
his or her ability to function in that position, then other possibilities,
such as a mutually agreeable reassignment to other duties or separation should
be explored. If these are not practicable, or if no other solution
acceptable to the parties can be found, then the administration should
invoke peer consideration regarding any contemplated sanctions. 6/
10.The standard for dismissal or severe sanction remains that of adequate
cause, and the mere fact of successive negative reviews does not in any way
diminish the obligation of the institution to show such cause for dismissal
in a separate forum before an appropriately constituted hearing body of
peers convened for that purpose. Evaluation records may be admissible but
rebuttable as to accuracy. Even if they are accurate, the administration is
still required to bear the burden of proof and demonstrate through an
adversarial proceeding not only that the negative evaluations rest on fact,
but also that the facts rise to the level of adequate cause for dismissal.
The faculty member must be afforded the full procedural safeguards set forth
in the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal
Proceedings and the Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, which include, among others, the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Footnotes
1/ These procedures are set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in
Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, and the Association's Recommended
Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure.Back to text
2/ See William Van Alstyne, "Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and 'Defense,'"
AAUP Bulletin, Autumn 1971, pp. 329-351, and Matthew W. Finkin, "The Assault
on Faculty Independence," Academe, July-August 1997, pp. 16-21.Back to text
3/Here, and in other Guidelines and Standards set forth below, the
procedures, in addition to conforming with established AAUP-supported
standards, should also conform to the applicable provisions of any
collective bargaining agreement. Back to text
4/ Again, the applicable policy statements are the 1940 Statement of
Principles, the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards, and the Recommended
Institutional Regulations.Back to text
5/ See Regulation 15, Recommended Institutional Regulations.Back to text
6/ See Regulations 5-7, Recommended Institutional Regulations. Back to text
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