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February 2006, Week 2

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From:
"James B. Byrne" <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
James B. Byrne
Date:
Thu, 9 Feb 2006 09:57:57 -0500
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On 8 Feb 2006 at 19:22, Greg Stigers wrote:

> But to ask on what basis truth and falsehood may be determined,
> and then to state the "truth" (in a sense of the word that
> destroys the sense of the word) is an expression of desire,
> seems dismissive of there being any such thing as truth or
> falsehood, at least in these matters. And it abandons the sort
> of verifiability you state that you admire, while denying it of
> others. 

I am in sympathy with much that you wrote and I myself find it 
difficult to accept much of what I now consider "truth" to consist 
of. However, my studies have led me to this formulation as the 
inescapable consequence of irremediable imperfection inherent in 
the concept of "knowledge".  Without perfect knowledge truth cannot 
be established. Most of what we think that we know is, in fact, 
little more than supposition, while the rest is far from certain in 
most respects.  In the absence of perfection we are each, in the 
end, condemned to accept that which we each "feel" is right, based 
on the limited information that we each can possess and often 
significantly influenced by what our neighbours profess.  

This is not a "good" or "bad" thing, it is the consequence of 
possessing limited biological resources to give over to 
contemplation in a hostile environment.  At some point in the 
decision making process the cost of obtaining more information 
exceeds the benefits to be gained from its possession. Since that 
point can never "known" any more than the primary question can be 
resolved, a heuristic process must perforce act to instigate 
action.  Otherwise we would all starve to death wondering what to 
have for breakfast.  This is the function of emotion.  Satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction are stimuli to act in the absence of certainty.

"Truth" is thus "post hoc" and is no more, and cannot be anything 
else, than an expression of our desire that something be so.  The 
social difficulty arises from the observation that once an 
individual has made the emotional investment to take a stand on the 
the issue of "truth" then the discovery of contradictory evidence 
is a most unwelcome development and its acceptance is usually 
resisted with some energy.  When the "truth" forms some part of the 
social bond then the investment is greater and the resistance to 
contraction far more intense in consequence.

The discussion of the present US role in and actions with respect 
to Iraq amply demonstrate this.  I doubt very much that the same 
intensity of discussion would be generated, or that the same 
intellectual, moral and political stances with respect to the 
justification used or the methods employed, would be exhibited by 
certain people, if it were the Russians presently in Iraq and the 
United States had opposed that intervention.  And yet, other than 
that the players would then be "them" instead of "us", what else 
would be fundamentally different?  

I propose that any difference lies principally in the idea of group 
loyalty, the emotional tie that our social "myths" and "truths" 
establish among our fellows and our desire that our group be 
considered "moral" and "righteous" in order to protect and 
strengthen that tie.  If it is "them" then our emotional investment 
is minimal and the incentive to engender a consensus on the issue 
of "truth" absent. 

I do not believe that nothing can be "known". I only question the 
idea that "truth" as popularly conceived is anything more than an 
idiosyncratic formulation that reconciles an individual's 
perceptions with pre-existing understandings of their place in 
existence.  What I question is not "truth" as such, but the idea 
that there can be a universal "truth" wherever desire exists.  And, 
in my experience, desire is an irreducible component of human 
behaviour.

Thus "truth" in practice usually comes down to what the 
preponderant majority of a social group decides to accept, and 
every other alternative is considered "false" in consequence.  The 
degree of agitation engendered by individual or competitive group 
dissent with a group consensus reveals two things, the degree to 
which emotional attachment to the idea is important to its members, 
and the weakness of the evidence upon which many "truths" are 
founded.

If "truth" were truly objective then it would stand or fall on its 
own, without any need for human debate or argument.  God would not 
need religion and religion would not require priests, rabbis, 
immans, monks, gurus or ministers.  Faith would never know doubt,  
Charity would be without bound, and Love would be the natural 
condition between all people. It is human desire that generates the 
distinctions between faiths and opens the chasms between peoples.  
Social "truths" in our present state of understanding are 
frequently no more than someone's claim to legitimacy, a political 
tool to induce a sense of commonality in some group and thereby 
gain control over its resources.  It is seldom, if ever, a simple 
exposure of what is. 

--   
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James B. Byrne                Harte & Lyne Limited
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fax: +1 905 561 0757          Hamilton, Ontario
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